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Abstract 
Individual-level data require protection from unauthorised access to safeguard confidentiality 
and security of sensitive information. Risks of disclosure are evaluated through privacy risk 
assessments and are controlled or minimised before data sharing and integration. The 
evolution from ‘Micro Data Laboratory’ traditions (i.e. access in controlled physical locations) 
to ‘Open Data’ (i.e. sharing individual-level data) drives the development of efficient 
anonymisation methods and protection controls. Effective anonymisation techniques should 
increase the uncertainty surrounding re-identification while retaining data utility, allowing 
informative data analysis. ‘Probabilistic anonymisation’ is one such technique, which alters 
the data by addition of random noise. In this paper, we describe the implementation of one 
probabilistic anonymisation technique into an operational software written in R and we 
demonstrate its applicability through application to analysis of asthma-related data from the 
ALSPAC cohort study. The software is designed to be used by data managers and users 
without the requirement of advanced statistical knowledge. 
 
Keywords 
Probabilistic anonymisation, disclosure control, measurement error, h-rank index, ALSPAC 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
Data custodians managing longitudinal study data resources use a variety of policies and 
processes to manage risks to participant confidentiality and data security when sharing data. 
This can form a means to help meet legal requirements and also a component of wider 
strategies to retain participant trust and the public acceptability of research (Carter, Laurie, 
& Dixon-Woods, 2015). Approaches range from: 1) removing directly identifiable information 
(see panel 1 for term definitions); 2) only providing access to accredited users; 3) allocating 
(project-specific) pseudo IDs to each subject; 4) making adjustments to outlying values and 
small cell counts; 5) sub-setting datasets to only include data required for specific 
investigations; 6) transforming data through complex statistical processes that mask or block 
access to the underlying individual-level data; and, 7) sharing and using data within secure 
policy and procedural frameworks (Elliot, Mackey, O'Hara, & Tudor, 2016), such as Data Safe 
Havens (Burton et al., 2015). 
 
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Parliament, 2018), through 
national implementations such as the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) (UK Parliament, 2018), 
distinguishes between personal data and anonymous data. Personal data is defined as 
“information relating to natural persons who: a) can be identified or who are identifiable, 
directly from the information in question; or b) who can be indirectly identified from that 
information in combination with other information”. Therefore, personal information, 
includes data with direct identifier variables or data where identity can be determined 
through linking to other readily available information. This classification is important as the 
safeguards required for the use of personal information are far more stringent than the 
safeguards required for the use of anonymous data. The DPA – even when research 
exemptions apply – requires that individuals are informed of the use of their personal 
information, and that the security of the data is maintained through the research process. 
Furthermore, even when these safeguards are in place, the DPA requires that data are de-
identified as soon in the research process as possible – ideally prior to the point when the 
data are provided to researchers. In contrast, anonymous data do not fall under the scope of 
the DPA (or GDPR) and are therefore exempt from these requirements.  
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Panel 1: Disclosure Control Terminology 
Data Custodians: authorised individuals/entities who manage and share study data. While 
(typically) authorised to view identifiable data, there is a risk they can accidentally disclose 
data through data breaches or accidentally and spontaneously identify a participant. 
Accredited User: a bona-fide professional working for a bona-fide institution for a bona-
fide purpose who can be expected to operate professionally and to not deliberately 
disclose information. The potential for accidental disclosure remains. Similar to the ‘Safe 
Researcher’ concept. 
External Attacker: an individual who will attempt to deliberately disclose participant 
information for malicious means. 
Individual of Interest: the participant(s) targeted by an external attacker. 
Direct Identifier(s): a data item that on its own could identify an individual (e.g. name, full 
date of birth, full address, health or other service ID number). The GDPR/DPA 2018 has 
expanded the legal definition of personal identifiers to include genetic sequence 
information (when used for linkage) as well as digital network identifiers (such as internet 
‘IP’ addresses). 
Indirect-Identifier(s) (aka Quasi-Identifiers): social or health variables with (context-
specific) potential to disclose an individual’s identity (i.e. they are likely to be known or 
discoverable to an external attacker or spontaneously recognisable to someone who 
knows the individual), for example: parity, height, weight, disease status, occupation 
categories. 
Non-Identifier(s): variables with exceptionally limited potential to disclose an individual’s 
identity. These will tend to be transient values (e.g. blood pressure readings). 
 
Under the new DPA 2018 legislation, longitudinal research studies are required (Article 35 of 
the GDPR) to consider the risks associated with data processing and use. Through conducting 
‘Data Protection Impact Assessments’, data custodians will assess risks (e.g. loss of control of 
data when sharing with external research users) and will have to implement controls to 
mitigate these risks (e.g. effectively anonymising the data). Given the pressures to share data, 
it seems inevitable that DPA 2018 will provide a new impetus for data guardians to explore 
options for effective disclosure control. As a community, the data guardians of longitudinal 
studies should work together to understand the options available, the impact these may have 
on research utility and how to implement anonymisation strategies effectively. The risk of not 
doing this is that poorly executed anonymisation strategies reveal sensitive information about 
participants and bring the research community into disrepute. While we are fortunate that 
there are no known examples of this within the longitudinal research community, we should 
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take note of parallel examples of poor practice (e.g. in 2014, the New York Taxi & Limousine 
Commission released data on 173 million individual journeys, yet a poor anonymisation 
strategy meant that individuals could easily be re-identified and their sensitive information 
breached (Pandurangan, 2014)). 
 
Achieving anonymity in a dataset is challenging and is complicated by the fact that much 
population discovery science, particularly that informed by longitudinal studies, relies on 
broad datasets of granular detailed individual-level data. These data are ideal for assessing 
life-course associations and controlling for socially mediated status, yet are also ideally suited 
– given their rich and typically unique patterns of values – for identifying participants’ real-
world identities. This situation is further complicated by the fact that some indirect identifiers 
have research value (e.g. age, gender), so that the different classes of identifiers (direct, 
indirect, non) often cannot be viewed in isolation and that identification risk is context 
specific. Existing approaches to controlling for this risk, such as k-anonymisation (El Emam & 
Dankar, 2008; Sweeney, 2002), attempt to mask these patterns of uniqueness through 
supressing and aggregating data values. While this technique offers some protection to 
disclosure risk (Domingo-Ferrer, Sebé, & Castellà-Roca, 2004), it also has the potential to 
impact the utility of the data to inform the research question. 
 
Goldstein and Shlomo (2018) suggest the use of a probabilistic anonymisation approach to 
perturb the data through the addition of random noise to some or all variables in the dataset. 
In this approach, the risks posed by an external ‘attacker’ who wished to re-identify an 
individual of interest from a dataset, are assessed. In this risk scenario, it is assumed that the 
attacker independently knows the individual’s data values for some or all the identifying 
variables within the dataset. Using this information, the attacker could ‘link’ to the target 
individual’s record using the unique patterns in their data, and therefore learn new 
information about that person from their associated attribute variables. To avoid such 
identification, Goldstein and Shlomo propose that sufficient noise is generated and added to 
the identifying variables to disguise their values as they appear to any attacker. From the 
research perspective, the accredited user is provided with sufficient information to remove 
the effects of the noise during the analysis stage to recover the underlying data structure and 
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therefore to produce consistent parameter estimates. This is done through the use of 
statistical techniques for fitting models with measurement errors (see Goldstein, Browne, & 
Charlton, 2017). 
 
This paper, in contrast to Goldstein and Shlomo’s methodological manuscript, presents a 
pragmatic perspective with worked examples. To apply Goldstein and Shlomo’s methodology, 
we have written an operational software package using the open-source statistical 
programming language R. We use data from participants of the Avon Longitudinal Study of 
Parents and Children (ALSPAC) birth cohort study to demonstrate the feasibility and 
practicality of the approach. For illustration of the method, we anonymise asthma-related 
data by adding differing degrees of noise. We then perform three exemplar analyses on the 
differing versions of anonymised data, treating the noise as measurement error. Finally, we 
assess how well the true model parameters are retrieved and we compare the differing risks 
of residual disclosure in the different datasets. 
 
Software package 
We have developed two functions in R (Avraam, 2018); the function probAnon(), which adds 
noise to an input dataset, and the function hRanks(), which generates a re-identification risk 
measure. Software to carry out the data modelling has been written in MATLAB (Mathworks, 
2016). 
 
The probAnon() function 
The function probAnon() applies probabilistic anonymisation to an input dataset. The 
algorithm first separates the input data into two subset data frames, one for the continuous 
(numerical) and one for the categorical (integer or factor) variables. Then, normally 
distributed random noise with user-specified variances is added, independently, to the 
continuous and categorical variables. For continuous variables, the variance of noise is 
specified as a percentage of each variable’s observed variance in the argument weights, which 
is a vector (w1, …, ws) of length s, where s is the number of continuous variables in the input 
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dataset. If the user does not specify the vector of weights, each weight is set to 0.1 by default, 
which means that the variance of the added noise is equal to the 10% of the observed variance 
of the variable. The random noise added to each binary variable follows a normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance specified by the user. The added noise therefore, converts 
binary data to continuous. For the ‘noisy’ continuous form of 0–1 binary variables, the 
algorithm then truncates any negative values to 0 and any values greater than 1 to 1. This 
step is not strictly necessary, particularly since it tends to increase identifiability risk, but may 
be convenient for presentational purposes and serves in the present context to present a 
worst case scenario. The output is then the input dataset plus the added noise. In addition, 
the argument seed, allows the user to set a certain random number generator. If this 
argument is not specified, the function bases the seed parameter on the local time (as 
determined by the computer’s internal clock). 
 
The hRanks() function 
The function hRanks() calculates a re-identification risk measure (the h-rank index) of 
anonymised data using the method proposed by Goldstein and Shlomo (2018). The function 
takes as input arguments the original dataset and the anonymised dataset (both having the 
same dimensions). The conceptual basis of the h-rank index is to estimate the probability of 
an attacker being successful in identifying their individual of interest within the anonymised 
dataset. We assume that a potential attacker will have access to some information about an 
individual they are targeting (we note that this assumption is also explicit within Data 
Protection legislation and represents a data guardian’s worst case scenario). 
 
We describe the logic of this function here and illustrate this in panel 2. Initially (step 1), the 
algorithm calculates the Euclidean distances (defined as the square root of the sum of the 
squares of the differences between the corresponding coordinates of two vectors) between 
each row in the true dataset and all rows in the noisy dataset (i.e. a pair-wise comparison that 
ultimately assesses all possible pairs). It then (step 2), ranks the distances to determine how 
close each true record is to every record in the noisy dataset (i.e. a 1 to n comparison where 
n is the total number of records), and identifies the position of the closest record (i.e. the 
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record that corresponds to rank equal to one). We use the standard competition ranking 
method (where ties are allocated the same rank, and the next allocated rank is offset by the 
number of ties, e.g. “1224”), which is performed by the R function rank() with the argument 
ties.method=‘min’. In step 3, the algorithm generates a duplicate copy of the true dataset and 
computes the Euclidean distances between each row in the true dataset with all rows in the 
copy of the true dataset and ranks them in order of distance (i.e. a 1 to n comparison similar 
to step 2). In step 4, the algorithm identifies the ranks of the distances calculated in step 3 at 
the locations specified in step 2. Finally (step 5), the algorithm calculates the difference (h-
rank index) between the ranks located in step 4 and the ranks located in step 2, and returns 
a vector with those differences. Note that the critical observations to identify in step 2 are all 
ranked 1 (or a tied equivalent) as the role of step 2 is to search for the closest noisy record to 
each true record. If h=0 for any one record that an attacker has available (and belongs to the 
dataset), then this implies that the noisy record identified by the attacker as the closest one 
in terms of the distance metric, is in fact the true one. The average value of h-rank indices 
provides a metric of disclosiveness. The larger the average value of h, the greater the level of 
unreliability in any attempt to disclose identity through exploiting a given individual’s known 
pattern of data values. Where the average of h is small (i.e. lower than an acceptable 
threshold pre-specified by the study data custodian), the probAnon() function can be re-used 
to alter the data with a higher level of noise in order to increase the uncertainty of re-
identification. 
 
Some care is needed where there are more than a negligible number of tied distances. This 
will be a particular issue with categorical, including binary, data. For example, where a dataset 
consists of only four binary indicators, there are only 16 possible patterns; meaning that for 
any given record where noise has been added there will be many tied rank distances. For an 
attacker, when estimating h, this will result in additional uncertainty. Thus, for example, if 
there are p tied ranks and the correct true record is among these, the attacker will be 
confronted with p records with h=0, and will be able to choose the correct one only with 
probability 1/p. To reflect this so that we can consistently report our risk measure on the scale 
of h, a very small amount of noise is added to each of the identifiers in order to break the ties 
and so that the true record will therefore be identified as the closest with probability 1/p. In 
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the present implementation (for the case that we have a dataset with only categorical 
variables) we have added, for all categorical (binary) variables, noise following a normal 
distribution with variance 10−8.  
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Examples 
To demonstrate the feasibility of the software, we show its applicability to childhood asthma 
data from participants in ALSPAC; a longitudinal birth cohort study collecting information of 
participants’ life-course exposures, and health, social and wellbeing outcomes (Boyd et al., 
2013). ALSPAC recruited pregnant women living in, and around, the city of Bristol (south-west 
UK) – who were due to deliver between 01/04/91 and 31/12/92. An initial total of 14,062 live-
born children were enrolled. By age 18, the enrolled sample had extended to include 14,775 
live-born individuals from 15,247 pregnancies. The assessment in this paper was conducted 
on a sample of 15,211 participants. Data is collected via questionnaires, study assessment 
visits, biological and ’omic characterisations and linkage to routine records (see: 
www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers/access/ for ALSPAC data dictionary).  
 
Ethical approval for ALSPAC was obtained from the ALSPAC Law and Ethics Committee and 
the NHS Research Ethics Committees. The variables used in this exemplar application (see 
table 1) were selected and then reviewed by an ALSPAC data custodian (author AB) using the 
ALSPAC privacy impact/risk assessment template. This assessment (based on an assumption 
that a potential attacker had some access to real information about their target) noted that 
the dataset contained Direct Identifiers (study ID), Indirect Identifiers, Non-Identifiers and 
Outcome variables (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Asthma-related variables from the ALSPAC birth cohort study.  
Variable 
identification 
Type Identifier/ 
Outcome 
Missing 
values* 
Explanation 
b650 binary Indirect 2009 
ever smoked (completed by mother 
at 18 weeks of gestation) 
kz021 binary Indirect 517 child’s sex 
kc362 binary Indirect 4144 
never exposed to passive smoke 
(completed by mother at 15 months) 
kc401 
multi-
categorical 
Indirect 4231 
ever breast fed (completed by 
mother at 15 months) 
m2110 binary Non 7036 
there is damp/condensation/ 
mould in home (completed by 
mother at 7 years 1 month) 
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dda_91 binary Outcome 7053 
doctor ever diagnosed asthma 
(completed by mother at 91 months) 
kv1059 
multi-
categorical 
Outcome 7426 
child had asthma in past 12 months 
(completed by mother at 128 
months) 
height_f8 continuous Indirect 8028 
child's height (cm), (measured by 
fieldworker at ‘focus@8’ clinical 
assessment visit at mean age 103.8 
months) 
weight_f8 continuous Indirect 8249 
child's weight (kg), (measured by 
fieldworker at ‘focus@8’ clinical 
assessment visit at mean age 103.8 
months) 
raw_fev1_f8 continuous Outcome 8301 
forced expiratory volume in 1 
second, (measured by fieldworker at 
‘focus@8’ clinical assessment visit at 
mean age 103.8 months) 
*The number of missing values includes also the ‘not completed’, ‘don’t know’ and ‘no 
response’ answers. 
 
We conducted a complete case analysis that was restricted to participants with non-missing 
data on all relevant variables. We calculated the children’s body mass index (BMI) using the 
relationship BMI = weight ∕ (height/100)2. We then created three separate datasets: 
dataset A with the variables ASTHMA = dda_91, SMOKE = kc362, BREAST FED = kc401 
and MOULD = m2110; dataset B with the variables ASTHMA = dda_91, BMI = weight_f8/
(height_f8)2 and BREAST FED = kc401; dataset C with the variables FEV1 =  raw_fev1_f8, 
BMI = weight_f8 ∕ (height_f8)2, SEX = kz021 and SMOKE = b650. From each of the three 
datasets we removed any rows with missing values. This results in datasets with 6837, 4975 
and 5942 complete records respectively. We then converted the multi-categorical variables 
(see type of each variable in table 1) to binary data. For the variable kc401 (ever breast fed), 
we combined together the categories “Yes, no longer” and “Yes, still” and replaced their 
values with ones while we replaced the values in the category “No, never” with zeros. For the 
variable kv1059 (child had asthma in past 12 months, completed by mother at 128 months), 
we combined together the categories “Yes, but did not see a doctor” and “Yes, saw a doctor” 
and replaced their values with ones while we replaced the values in the category “No, did not 
have” with zeros. We finally generated ‘noisy’ datasets for each true dataset (A–C) using the 
probAnon() function. For datasets A and B we do not add noise to the ASTHMA variable, which 
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is used as the response variable in a probit regression model. For all the other variables we 
add normally distributed noise with zero mean and variance equal to the value shown in table 
2. We have not considered the case where noise is added to the response variable where this 
is binary. This feature is described in Goldstein and Shlomo (2018) but has not yet been 
implemented in the analysis software. 
 
Table 2: Variances of the added noise. Note that for binary variables we add different levels 
of noise. 
Dataset Variable Type 
True variance of 
variable 
Variance of added 
noise 
A 
ASTHMA binary response 0.160 - 
SMOKE binary covariate 0.231 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 
BREAST FED binary covariate 0.171 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 
MOULD binary covariate 0.244 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 
B 
ASTHMA binary response 0.109 - 
BMI continuous covariate 5.512 0.55 
BREAST FED binary covariate 0.151 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 
C 
FEV1 continuous response 0.069 0.0069 
BMI continuous covariate 5.828 0.58 
SEX binary covariate 0.250 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 
SMOKE binary covariate 0.248 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 
 
Results 
We apply regression models to the true and noisy data of each dataset (A–C) and compare 
the estimated coefficients. Each regression model is applied to the true data using common 
functions for generalised linear models (e.g. glm() function in R) and to the noisy data using a 
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm that allows the recovery of the 
original data structure (see description of this procedure in Goldstein et al., 2017). We have 
not run full simulations of the data. We note that a true simulation to derive population 
estimates will require both the generation of a model using assumed population parameters 
and for each of these generated datasets the further generation of a set of models where the 
noise is sampled from the assumed noise distribution. Goldstein and Shlomo (2018) ran 
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simulations with both continuous and binary covariates that pointed to negligible bias for the 
general procedure. 
 
Dataset A 
Dataset A consists only of binary data and without special care will give many tied rank 
distances. To illustrate this, we present the frequencies of all possible combinations for the 
true values of dataset A in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Frequencies for all possible combinations of values for dataset A. 
ASTHMA SMOKE BREAST FED MOULD Frequency 
0 0 0 0 380 
0 0 0 1 181 
0 0 1 0 1691 
0 0 1 1 1308 
0 1 0 0 357 
0 1 0 1 227 
0 1 1 0 758 
0 1 1 1 567 
1 0 0 0 91 
1 0 0 1 61 
1 0 1 0 348 
1 0 1 1 310 
1 1 0 0 133 
 
We see from table 3 that the smallest set of identical combinations of identifiers confronting 
an attacker is 61, and the largest 1691. We have therefore used the procedure of adding 
additional ‘tie-breaking’ noise and see that the probabilities for a successful attack are still 
acceptably small. Table 4 gives the estimates of disclosiveness as expressed in terms of ℎ 
based on 100 simulations. The big number of simulations is used to demonstrate stable 
estimates.  
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Table 4: Cumulative probabilities of h for noisy dataset A, at 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles. 
No noise is added to the response variable. Noise with variance 0.05 (scenario 1), 0.1 (scenario 
2), 0.2 (scenario 3) and 0.5 (scenario 4) is added to all predictors. 100 simulated noise 
additions used. 
Scenario Percentile P(ℎ = 0) P(ℎ ≤ 1) P(ℎ ≤ 2) P(ℎ ≤ 3) P(ℎ ≤ 4) P(ℎ ≤ 5) 
1 
10% 0.0265 0.0286 0.0307 0.0327 0.0343 0.0369 
50% 0.0105 0.0128 0.0155 0.0177 0.0200 0.0219 
90% 0.0088 0.0112 0.0139 0.0162 0.0185 0.0208 
2 
10% 0.0230 0.0250 0.0275 0.0301 0.0326 0.0340 
50% 0.0091 0.0116 0.0141 0.0167 0.0191 0.0213 
90% 0.0069 0.0094 0.0119 0.0143 0.0167 0.0191 
3 
10% 0.0221 0.0239 0.0253 0.0273 0.0281 0.0300 
50% 0.0084 0.0109 0.0129 0.0150 0.0169 0.0193 
90% 0.0063 0.0087 0.0110 0.0132 0.0151 0.0174 
4 
10% 0.0143 0.0156 0.0165 0.0175 0.0182 0.0189 
50% 0.0048 0.0063 0.0076 0.0088 0.0102 0.0113 
90% 0.0034 0.0049 0.0063 0.0078 0.0092 0.0104 
 
To analyse the data from dataset A, we apply a probit regression model where the asthma 
indicator is regressed on smoking, breastfeeding and presence of mould 
probit(𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐻𝑀𝐴) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝑂𝐾𝐸) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇 𝐹𝐸𝐷) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑂𝑈𝐿𝐷).                    (1) 
The estimated coefficients from the analysis, and their standard errors, are shown in table 5. 
We observe that the estimates of the model applied to noisy data using the procedure that 
removes the noise are close to the estimates of the model applied to the true data (i.e. an 
overlap between their confidence intervals).  
 
Table 5: Estimated parameters and their standard errors for dataset A. The first row shows 
the estimated coefficients of the model applied to the true records and scenarios 1–4 show 
the estimated coefficients of the model applied to noisy data using procedures to recover the 
data structure. Note that the response variable was without noise and noise with variance 
0.05 (scenario 1), 0.1 (scenario 2), 0.2 (scenario 3) and 0.5 (scenario 4) was added to all 
predictors. The results in scenarios 1–4 show the means of 50 MCMC simulations. 
Scenario Data 𝛽0 (SE) 𝛽1 (SE) 𝛽2 (SE) 𝛽3 (SE) 
 True data -0.809 (0.043) 0.124 (0.036) -0.131 (0.042) 0.053 (0.035) 
1 Noisy data -0.817 (0.018) 0.115 (0.032) -0.114 (0.038) 0.048 (0.031) 
2 Noisy data -0.777 (0.042) 0.115 (0.043) -0.167 (0.044) 0.048 (0.036) 
3 Noisy data -0.828 (0.031) 0.062 (0.027) -0.063 (0.026) 0.027 (0.026) 
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4 Noisy data -0.842 (0.024) 0.040 (0.019) -0.027 (0.020) 0.016 (0.019) 
 
Dataset B 
Dataset B includes both binary and continuous covariates. We add noise with variance equal 
to 10% of the true variance to BMI variable and noise with variance 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.5 to 
the breastfeeding variable. The cumulative probabilities of h based on 100 simulations are 
shown in table 6. We observe that probabilities of h to be less than a certain value are 
increasing with the increase of noise added to the binary variable (i.e. comparing the values 
between scenario 1, which refers to noise with variance 0.05, and scenario 4, which refers to 
noise with variance 0.5 added to the binary breastfeeding variable). We also observe higher 
values of probabilities at the 10th and 90th percentiles in contrast with the lower values at the 
median (50th percentile). In addition, the probabilities at the 10th percentile are systematically 
higher than the probabilities at the 90th percentile, which is related to the slightly right-
skewed actual distribution of the continuous BMI.  
 
Table 6: Cumulative probabilities of h for noisy dataset B, at 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles. 
No noise is added to the response variable. Noise with variance 0.55 was added to BMI and 
noise with variance 0.05 (scenario 1), 0.1 (scenario 2), 0.2 (scenario 3) and 0.5 (scenario 4) 
was added to breastfeeding variable. 100 simulated noise additions used in computations. 
Scenario Percentile P(ℎ = 0) P(ℎ ≤ 1) P(ℎ ≤ 2) P(ℎ ≤ 3) P(ℎ ≤ 4) P(ℎ ≤ 5) 
1 
10% 0.0071 0.0136 0.0191 0.0246 0.0299 0.0356 
50% 0.0060 0.0115 0.0168 0.0219 0.0269 0.0319 
90% 0.0070 0.0128 0.0183 0.0234 0.0285 0.0336 
2 
10% 0.0071 0.0136 0.0191 0.0247 0.0300 0.0358 
50% 0.0059 0.0113 0.0167 0.0217 0.0267 0.0316 
90% 0.0069 0.0126 0.0181 0.0232 0.0283 0.0333 
3 
10% 0.0066 0.0127 0.0178 0.0232 0.0282 0.0335 
50% 0.0055 0.0106 0.0156 0.0203 0.0249 0.0296 
90% 0.0065 0.0118 0.0170 0.0218 0.0266 0.0314 
4 
10% 0.0056 0.0106 0.0149 0.0196 0.0237 0.0283 
50% 0.0047 0.0089 0.0131 0.0171 0.0210 0.0250 
90% 0.0055 0.0101 0.0145 0.0186 0.0227 0.0268 
 
For dataset B, we apply a probit regression model where the asthma indicator is regressed on 
BMI and breastfeeding 
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probit(𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐻𝑀𝐴) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑀𝐼) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇 𝐹𝐸𝐷).                                                        (2) 
A comparison of the results derived from the model applied to the true and the noisy data 
are shown in table 7. Similarly to the results obtained from dataset A, we observe a highly 
accurate estimation of the model parameters by fitting the model to the noisy data and 
removing the noise using MCMC procedures.  
 
Table 7: Estimated parameters and their standard errors for dataset B. The first row shows 
the estimated coefficients of the model applied to the true records and scenarios 1–4 show 
the estimated coefficients of the model applied to noisy data where noise with variance 0.55 
was added to BMI and noise with variance 0.05 (scenario 1), 0.1 (scenario 2), 0.2 (scenario 3) 
and 0.5 (scenario 4) was added to the breastfeeding variable. Note that the response variable 
is without noise. The results in scenarios 1–4 show the means of 50 MCMC simulations. 
Scenario Data 𝛽0 (SE) 𝛽1 (SE) 𝛽2 (SE) 
 True data -1.261 (0.174) 0.010 (0.010) -0.078 (0.058) 
1 Noisy data -1.256 (0.174) 0.009 (0.010) -0.072 (0.054) 
2 Noisy data -1.250 (0.170) 0.008 (0.011) -0.065 (0.070) 
3 Noisy data -1.325 (0.176) 0.011 (0.010) -0.027 (0.036) 
4 Noisy data -1.330 (0.167) 0.011 (0.010) -0.014 (0.026) 
 
Dataset C 
Probabilistic anonymisation has been also applied to dataset C and the cumulative 
probabilities for h at different percentiles based on 100 simulations are shown in table 8. The 
difference in dataset C (in contrast with datasets A and B) is the outcome variable, which is 
continuous instead of binary, and therefore noise is added to the outcome in the same way 
as the noise is added to any continuous explanatory variables. 
 
Table 8: Cumulative probabilities of h for noisy dataset C, at 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles. 
Noise with variance 0.0069 was added to the outcome FEV1 variable, noise with variance 0.58 
was added to BMI and noise with variance 0.05 (scenario 1), 0.1 (scenario 2), 0.2 (scenario 3) 
and 0.5 (scenario 4) was added to sex and smoke indicators. 100 simulations used. 
Scenario Percentile P(ℎ = 0) P(ℎ ≤ 1) P(ℎ ≤ 2) P(ℎ ≤ 3) P(ℎ ≤ 4) P(ℎ ≤ 5) 
1 
10% 0.0204 0.0377 0.0522 0.0661 0.0785 0.0896 
50% 0.0206 0.0371 0.0514 0.0644 0.0761 0.0866 
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90% 0.0209 0.0375 0.0522 0.0650 0.0768 0.0874 
2 
10% 0.0194 0.0365 0.0505 0.0648 0.0772 0.0878 
50% 0.0196 0.0356 0.0496 0.0625 0.0741 0.0845 
90% 0.0200 0.0361 0.0505 0.0631 0.0748 0.0852 
3 
10% 0.0179 0.0332 0.0463 0.0591 0.0708 0.0807 
50% 0.0180 0.0327 0.0457 0.0575 0.0685 0.0782 
90% 0.0183 0.0332 0.0465 0.0582 0.0691 0.0789 
4 
10% 0.0140 0.0264 0.0365 0.0465 0.0561 0.0641 
50% 0.0143 0.0258 0.0359 0.0453 0.0540 0.0615 
90% 0.0146 0.0264 0.0369 0.0461 0.0548 0.0625 
 
For dataset C, the force expiratory volume in 1 second is regressed on BMI, sex and smoking 
𝐹𝐸𝑉1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑀𝐼) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐸𝑋) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝑂𝐾𝐸).                                                                    (3) 
The estimated coefficients with their standard errors are shown in table 9. 
  
Table 9: Estimated parameters and their standard errors for dataset C. The first row shows 
the estimated coefficients of the model applied to the true records and scenarios 1–4 show 
the estimated coefficients estimated from the model applied to noisy data. Noise with 
variance 0.0069 was added to the outcome FEV1 variable, noise with variance 0.58 was added 
to BMI and noise with variance 0.05 (scenario 1), 0.1 (scenario 2), 0.2 (scenario 3) and 0.5 
(scenario 4) was added to sex and smoking indicators. The results in scenarios 1–4 show the 
means of 50 MCMC simulations. 
Scenario Data 𝛽0 (SE) 𝛽1 (SE) 𝛽2 (SE) 𝛽3 (SE) 
 True data 1.139 (0.024) 0.029 (0.001) 0.105 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) 
1 Noisy data 1.145 (0.025) 0.029 (0.001) 0.096 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) 
2 Noisy data 1.140 (0.026) 0.029 (0.001) 0.051 (0.032) -0.005 (0.006) 
3 Noisy data 1.182 (0.025) 0.028 (0.001) 0.051 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) 
4 Noisy data 1.194 (0.025) 0.028 (0.001) 0.031 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 
 
We see from these example analyses that the disclosure risk increases with the number of 
identifying variables used, but remains acceptable. These results suggest that for similar 
datasets the amount of noise added could safely be reduced. Nevertheless, when a large 
number of variables is involved in a dataset, the values of h-rank index will be expected to 
increase and this is clearly an area for further exploration. We also note that, especially for 
binary variables, estimates derived from the noisy data can have large standard errors and 
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the true estimates from the real data can be very different. The amount of noise added to the 
binary variables in scenario 4 has a standard deviation √0.5 = 0.71, which is very large 
compared to the range (0,1) of the true data and therefore we get a lot of instability (as 25% 
of observed zeros get wrongly defined to their true category). This suggests that further work 
is needed for such cases and table 8 suggests that smaller values should produce acceptable 
values for h. We conclude that for even low levels of noise the method is sufficient to 
effectively anonymise the records, but we show the example of noise added to the binary 
with variance 0.5 as a warning to data managers on the increase in the loss of utility. 
 
Discussion 
We have shown how a probabilistic anonymisation procedure can be applied to data 
management procedures in such a way that disclosure risk is reduced to acceptable levels 
while retaining the ability to carry out statistical analysis. The analysis conducted on the noisy, 
anonymous, data suffered some loss of statistical efficiency when compared with analysis on 
the true data; a consequence of which is enlarged confidence intervals and fewer significant 
inferences. Where the variance of noise added to the binary covariates is large (i.e. > 0.2), 
there is likely to be unacceptably high loss of statistical efficiency and for binary data biases 
may also be introduced. This example illustrates the challenge in balancing disclosure control 
with retaining data utility. 
 
When considering disclosure risk, data custodians should consider the risk of motivated 
external attackers, accidental disclosure to authorised users and also the possible 
consequences of human error. In the first scenario (external attacker) the attacker may be 
motivated to identify a given individual due to their notoriety (for example an investigative 
journalist following a story or a researcher illustrating the fallacy of supposed ‘anonymity’ 
(Sweeney, 2002)) or out of personal interest. In the second, an accredited user or data 
custodian may recognise an individual during their legitimate work, and in the third an 
authorised user may inadvertently release a dataset to a wider than authorised audience 
through a data breach. In all these scenarios identification of a given data subject is likely to 
occur through matching known ‘real world’ information about an individual to equivalent 
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information about the same individual within a dataset. Probabilistic anonymisation helps 
control for these risks by removing certainty about whether the values being considered in 
the noisy data are true ‘real world’ values. The h-rank index disclosure measure proposed by 
Goldstein and Shlomo (2018), adopts this perspective by seeking to establish how well any 
single individual is ‘hidden amongst the crowd’ of the other individuals in the dataset. While 
this approach seems conceptually appropriate – it has some limitations. We found that, in its 
current state of development, the h-rank index was unable to adequately account for 
disclosure risk of outliers (this was acknowledged by Goldstein and Shlomo (2018)) but this 
can be addressed through suitable pre-processing techniques such as truncating them. It was 
also unable to account for the disclosure risk of clusters of individuals who all have the same 
outcome value, i.e. that it is not necessary to identify the Individual of Interest within the 
cluster if they all have the same outcome of interest. This phenomenon is known elsewhere 
in the privacy literature (Machanavajjhala, Gehrke, Kifer, & Venkitasubramaniam, 2006) and 
could be quantified by including l-diversity metrics to assess outcome value diversity. Finally 
we found that the h-rank index was also unable to account for the protective benefits of the 
sample being selected from a wider population (again a point noted by Goldstein and Shlomo 
(2018)). While this last point would be difficult to accommodate in a metric, it could be 
incorporated into the Data Custodians risk assessment process. 
 
In practice, a data custodian, in conjunction with potential accredited users would need to 
evaluate the risks associated with applying any given amount of noise related to the potential 
loss of analysis efficiency. In some cases, it may not be desirable to release data into the public 
domain. We suggest that there are few, if any, situations where some variables of interest 
would need to be excluded, though this remains an area for further study. However, our 
findings that large amounts of noise impact model estimates suggest this may limit the 
application for datasets treated with large amounts of noise, e.g. they may be suitable only 
for training or data exploration rather than applied research. A more realistic application 
would be the use of probabilistic anonymisation to applying limited amounts of noise (to 
protect against spontaneous recognition or contained (i.e. not public) data breaches) and to 
supply accredited users with these noisy data under controlled ‘safe haven’ conditions. As 
such, probabilistic anonymisation will add to the range of tools available to data managers 
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that include manual data transformations (such as outlier suppression), statistical approaches 
(e.g. synthetic data and k-anonymisation) and distributed ‘black box’ computing approaches 
(e.g. DataSHIELD (Wilson et al., 2017)). All such approaches involve trade-offs between 
disclosure control, impact on utility and impact on usability. Probabilistic anonymisation has 
one clear advantage over some of these approaches (e.g. k-anonymisation and synthetic data) 
in that it allows efficient and accurate data linkage to additional datasets, given that the noisy 
data can contain ID numbers and the noise can be applied over multiple datasets 
independently. Further work is needed to assess the extent to which these trade-offs apply 
in order to help inform the Data Custodian community as to which approach may best fit any 
given situation. 
 
The software functions developed here are proof of principle rather than fully developed 
‘commercial grade’ software. We have identified that improvements would be needed in the 
following areas before wider adoption: 1) the code needs to accommodate multi-category 
categorical variables; 2) missing values are not currently supported, we need to allow for 
these or to develop alternative approaches (e.g. imputation); 3) the h-rank index needs 
developing (as described above) and further consideration given to accommodating outlying 
values in a flexible manner.  
 
We have demonstrated that probabilistic anonymisation can be effectively deployed to help 
control for disclosure risk while producing accurate estimates. We have assumed that the 
data to be used is for bona-fide research scenarios (i.e. not for releasing data into the public 
domain) where responsible and verifiable data security measures are in place. Additionally, 
this concept would be novel to many data custodians who may not have advanced statistical 
expertise, so that determining the appropriate balance between disclosure risk control and 
retaining data utility would require training. With the enhancements we have identified the 
software assessed here could be developed into a fully functional tool for Data Custodians. 
This software would be a useful tool to help longitudinal studies maintain participant trust 
and to share data securely and effectively while meeting ever more stringent data protection 
requirements. 
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